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FINDING THE RIGHT FIT: ONE DESIGN
ELEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER RESOURCE REGIME
COALTER G. LATHROP*
INTRODUCTION
The international transboundary groundwater resource regime
will continue to develop as a series of bilateral or regional agreements
related to specific resource pools often referred to as aquifers or
1
aquifer systems. Unlike the emerging climate change regime, the
groundwater regime will not, and need not, become global in scope.
This prediction will not be surprising for those familiar with the
spatial distribution and physical attributes of groundwater and the
concept of territorial sovereignty in the international legal system.
However, with respect to forests – another resource that is rooted in
the territory in which it is located – a regime with global scope is
emerging. Why do we get different answers with respect to regime
scope for these two quintessentially sovereign resources?
The reason is straight-forward: the externalities – both positive
and negative – associated with groundwater are spatially bounded,
albeit on a continental scale, while some of the externalities
associated with forests are not since their spillover effects can be
global.2 Put another way, the goods and services associated with
Copyright © 2009 by Coalter G. Lathrop.
 Owner, Sovereign Geographic, Inc., an international boundary consultancy based in Asheville,
NC.
1. Among the questions put to the panel on water issues at the Duke Journal of
Comparative & International Law Symposium titled Local Property, Global Justice: Law and
Resources in the Era of Climate Change was this one: “Will water rights issues continue to
develop as agreements between neighboring countries, or do we need a more global vision?” I
understand this to be, primarily, a question about regime design, in particular the number and
identity of the actors that should be involved.
2. Breyer uses some of these terms in the context of describing rationales for regulation:
“The differences between true social costs and unregulated price are ‘spillover’ costs (or
benefits) – usually referred to by economists as ‘externalities.’” STEPHEN BREYER,
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groundwater are fully excludable from non-groundwater states. The
same is not true for forests, which provide some non-excludable
benefits – or positive externalities – and some spatially unbounded
negative externalities. Despite their location within the territory of a
single state, forests, as sinks for terrestrial carbon sequestration, are
an open-access common pool resource and, as sources of greenhouse
gas emissions create spillover effects with global scope.3
Understanding the spatial extent of the externalities associated
with a resource is an important first step in designing a regime to
address the human/environment problems arising from that resource.
Matching the spatial extent of the externalities with the spatial extent
of the regime is part of finding the right “fit” and is one determinant
of regime effectiveness.4 Although there are several elements of fit
between a resource regime and the biogeophysical system it is meant
to address, this essay deals only with identifying the appropriate
international actors. In the international domain, the question is
which states should (and which states should not) be included in the
management of a particular resource pool.
This essay contemplates the regime design question in the
international domain – the domain in which states interact – and
largely ignores the local domain, although it borrows concepts and
terminology from local property and common-pool resource
arrangements.5 In the process of scaling up and down between the
REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23 (1982). In theory, regulation would internalize the costs of
negative externalities. See id. In this essay, externalities occur when costs or benefits associated
with a resource “spillover” an international boundary; these are transnational externalities. A
properly designed international resource regime would include only those actors required to
internalize the externalities associated with that resource.
3. “Terrestrial carbon sequestration involves the net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere
by plants during photosynthesis and its fixation in vegetative biomass and in soils.” U.S. DEP’T
OF ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., CARBON SEQUESTRATION ATLAS OF THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA 6 (2d ed. 2008), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/
carbon_seq/refshelf/atlasII/atlasII.pdf.
4. The concept of fit, loosely applied in this essay, is borrowed from the institutional
design literature. See, e.g., ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT, INTERPLAY, AND SCALE 55 (2002) (“[T]he effectiveness of
environmental and resource regimes . . . is determined in considerable measure by the degree to
which they are compatible with the biogeophysical systems with which they interact. . . . It
follows that we should resist temptation to think that one size fits all when it comes to designing
regimes to solve a variety of environmental problems.”).
5. I attribute my use of the word “domain” to the edited volume by Robert Keohane and
Elinor Ostrom in which the authors explore some of the convergences of the common pool
resource and international relations literatures that have grown out of these “two domains.” See
LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION
IN TWO DOMAINS (Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom eds., 1995).
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two domains, one finds many analogs but most are not perfect
matches; territorial sovereignty does not quite equal real property
ownership. Moreover, some concepts or institutions found in one
domain simply do not exist in the other; overarching state authority,
an ever-present element in the local domain, is absent in the
international domain. Thus, while borrowing between the two
domains can be enlightening, it also has potential pitfalls.
Despite what may seem like an obvious prediction –
groundwater resource pools will be managed under bilateral or
regional agreements among states in which those pools are located –
there are some indications that groundwater is being misconceived as
a commons resource subject to a regime with global scope. This
misconception could lead to a misfit between the scope of the
resource-related problems and the scope of the regime, particularly
with regard to the number and identity of the actors involved.6 Such a
mismatch could in turn contribute to regime ineffectiveness and
inefficiency.
I. UNPACKING THE GROUNDWATER RESOURCE
The focus of this essay is on groundwater – water held in aquifers
7
underground in the phreatic or saturated zone – as opposed to
surface water (e.g. rivers and lakes). Still, much of this analysis is also
applicable to surface water and other shared resources in several
ways. First, groundwater, like most surface water, is located
exclusively within the territory of sovereign states. Second,
groundwater and surface water are often hydraulically connected
such that dividing them into two separate resources, although

6. The goal of finding the right fit is to avoid a misfit. This essay is specifically concerned
with avoiding a spatial misfit, which can occur when the “[i]nstitutional jurisdiction [is] too small
or too large to cover or affect the areal extent of the ecosystem(s) subject to the institution.”
Victor Galaz et al., The Problem of Fit among Biophysical Systems, Environmental and
Resource Regimes, and Broader Governance Systems: Insights and Emerging Challenges, in
INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, APPLICATIONS AND
RESEARCH FRONTIERS 147, 150 (Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King & Heike Schroeder eds.,
2008).
7. Aquifers are the “water-bearing layers of saturated underground rock and sand” while
“the water in them is called groundwater.” JEFFREY S. ASHLEY & ZACHARY A. SMITH,
GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST 5 (1999). The fact that groundwater moves
within aquifers should not be misunderstood to mean aquifers are underground rivers. With the
exception of “karst aquifers” which do resemble underground rivers, water flow in aquifers has
been compared to the flow of water through a sponge. See Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein,
A Hydrogeological Approach to Transboundary Ground Water Resources and International
Law, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 201, 217 (2003).
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convenient, does not conform to hydrological reality.8 Finally, ground
and surface water are indistinguishable H2O from a hydrochemical
perspective. Accordingly, these two parts of the freshwater resource
base are also often considered together in international legal
arrangements. Surface water has been the predominant concern,
while groundwater has been addressed as a secondary issue in waterspecific treaties or as one of many concerns in boundary delimitation
treaties.9
This emphasis on surface water is curious considering the relative
abundance of groundwater. If we exclude the vast amounts of
10
freshwater held in polar ice and in glaciers, groundwater is by far the
more abundant of the two remaining sources of freshwater – surface
water and groundwater – comprising 97% of all freshwater available
on the planet.11 Despite its relative abundance, the legal and policy
issues associated with groundwater are not as well-studied, and the
regimes governing its use in both the local and international domains
are in their infancy compared to the longer-standing regimes
addressing surface water.12 The reason for this state of relative neglect

8. Influent rivers replenish aquifers directly, and groundwater can discharge directly into
effluent rivers, other aquifers and the ocean. Kerstin Mechlem, International Groundwater Law:
Towards Closing the Gaps?, 14 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 47, 49 (2003); see also Eckstein &
Eckstein, supra note 7, at 214-15.
9. See, e.g., Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International
Watercourses art. 2, May 21, 1997, 35 I.L.M. 700, 704 (not in force) (including most types of
groundwater in the definition of “watercourse”); Albert E. Utton, The Development of
International Groundwater Law, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 1, 10 (Ludwik A.
Teclaff & Albert E. Utton eds., 1981) (“[G]roundwater is usually only a secondary issue which is
mentioned almost in passing.”) [herinafter Utton, The Development]; Dante A. Caponera &
Dominique Alhéritière, Principles for International Groundwater Law, in id. at 29-30 (discussing
international land boundary delimitation treaties in which transboundary groundwater is
considered); Mechlem, supra note 8, at 47 (“International law has only rarely taken account of
groundwater.”). For the texts of agreements that address transboundary groundwater resource
pools through approximately 1980, see Utton, The Development, supra, at 189. For the texts of
agreements concluded since approximately 1980, see U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL
ORG. [UNESCO] & FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORG. OF THE U.N. [FAO], FAO LEGISLATIVE
STUDY NO. 86, GROUNDWATER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPILATION OF TREATIES AND
OTHER LEGAL INSTRUMENTS (Stefano Burchi & Kerstin Mechlem eds., 2005).
10. Eckstein and Eckstein put the amount of freshwater held in ice caps, glaciers, ground
ice, permafrost and perennial snow at approximately 70% of total freshwater stocks on the
planet. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 7, at 204 fig. 1.
11. Int’l Law Comm’n, Seventh Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, 52, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/436 (Mar. 15, 1991) (prepared by Stephen C.
McCaffrey).
12. Utton, The Development, supra note 9, at 4 (“The laws governing groundwater
nationally are inadequately developed, and the law governing transboundary groundwaters is
only at the beginning state of development.”); Miguel Solanes, Institutional and Legal Issues
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can be attributed to the invisibility of groundwater: out of sight, out of
mind.
This attitude toward groundwater appears to be changing. In
2002, for example, the United Nations International Law Commission
(ILC) decided to include the topic of “shared natural resources” in its
program of work, the overall object of which is “the promotion of the
13
progressive development of international law and its codification.”
At that time the ILC took up the task of preparing draft articles on
the law of transboundary aquifers. The ILC drafting committee
adopted the text of those draft articles on second reading in May
2008.14 While the draft articles reflect some existing principles and
customary rules of international law, the articles themselves have, to
date, not been adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, are
not in force, and do not create any new rights or obligations.
Nonetheless, the draft articles will be considered below as both a
possible source of misconception about the scope of the regime and,
as the positive manifestation of United Nations member states’
perspectives on the issue, one yardstick against which to measure
conclusions.
In order to understand the characteristics of groundwater and
the spatial extent of the externalities associated with its use, it is
helpful to unpack the suite of goods and services the resource
provides. Resources tend not to be monolithic in their functionality.
Instead, they have multiple functionalities that, if not considered
separately, could mask each other’s distinct characteristics and lead to
a misconception of the biogeophysical system.15
Relevant to the Implementation of Water Markets, in GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY
PERSPECTIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD BANK SEMINAR, WORLD BANK TECHNICAL
PAPER NO. 456, 69, 71 (Salman M. A. Salman ed., 1999) (“The evolution of groundwater law
regarding ownership of this particular manifestation of water resources has been somehow
slower than the evolution of surface water law.”).
13. Statute of the International Law Commission art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 174(II), at 105, U.N.
Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947).
14. Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], Shared Natural Resources: The law of transboundary aquifers,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.724 (May 29, 2008).
15. Keohane and Ostrom demonstrate this point with respect to the rival or non-rival
characteristic of two aspects of groundwater:
Although this distinction is clear in the abstract, many physical resources
can be viewed as public goods in regard to some aspects of their provision
or use and as CPRs in regard to other aspects. Consider, for instance, the
problem of managing a groundwater basin. In regard to appropriation or
receiving benefits, the resource is clearly a common-pool resource – the
water extracted by one user reduces the supply available to others. In
regard to the regulation of the basin itself or its provision, protection of a
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It may be helpful for the reader, who likely is more familiar with
surface water, if only through casual observation, to make some
16
comparisons between surface water and groundwater. Groundwater
and surface water share many traits, but they also differ in important
ways. Groundwater and surface water both exist on a continental
scale, however, their distribution within the geography is markedly
different. As a general observation, groundwater is more widely
dispersed covering larger total areas, while surface water tends to be
channeled and more restrictively bounded. Indeed, groundwater
resource pools exist at such a large scale that many straddle not only
local property or federal state boundaries, but also international
boundaries, and, with the exception of remote islands, almost all
states share groundwater resources with at least one neighbor.17
Groundwater and surface water are both sources of water for
municipal, agricultural, and industrial uses, however, due largely to
their geographic distribution, the manner in which the two sources
are accessed is quite different. Groundwater, at least in principle, is
accessible to all inhabitants living above an aquifer through highlydistributed, mostly private, low-intensity investments and unlike
surface water does not require large public investment to extract,
store or transport.18 Groundwater and surface water are also sinks of
groundwater basin from salt-water intrusion, soil compaction or pollution is
a public good because protection of one user against destruction of the
basin also increases the supply of protection available to others.
Robert O. Keohane & Elinor Ostrom, Introduction, in LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL
INTERDEPENDENCE: HETEROGENEITY AND COOPERATION IN TWO DOMAINS, supra note 5, at
14.
16. Groundwater, especially groundwater found in “fossil” aquifers, may have more
similarities to hydrocarbon deposits of oil and gas. These aquifers are non-recharging and hold
water that may have been isolated from the hydrologic cycle for thousands if not millions of
years. Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 7, at 216-17. They do not experience flow and are “decoupled from contemporary recharge.” Jacob Burke et al., Groundwater and Society: Problems
in Variability and Points of Engagement, in GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 31, 36. It is possible that the sharing and management of these
resources could benefit from the oil and gas model in both the local and international domains.
17. Robert Glennon et al., Turning on the Tap: The World’s Water Problems, 3 FRONTIERS
IN ECOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 503, 504 (2005); Caponera & Alhéritière, supra note 9, at
26.
18. See Burke et al., supra note 16, at 32. (noting the differences between groundwater and
surface water in the socioeconomic context); Shammy Puri, Alice Aureli & Raya M. Stephan,
Shared Groundwater Resources: Global Significance for Social and Environmental
Sustainability, in OVEREXPLOITATION AND CONTAMINATION OF SHARED GROUNDWATER
RESOURCES 3, 7 (C.J.G. Darnault ed., 2008). It is this close spatial relationship between
groundwater users and the resource that inspires comments such as “Groundwater is a local
resource par excellence,” id., and “Groundwater is above all else a vicinity resource.”
UNESCO, INT’L HYDROLOGICAL PROGRAMME [IHP], GROUNDWATER RESOURCES OF THE
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pollution. In this role their main difference is their ability to recover
from overexploitation, pollution of groundwater often resulting in
irreversible damage as the “self-purifying qualities” of groundwater
and aquifers are less effective than those of surface water.19
Groundwater and surface water both flow,20 however,
groundwater flows at a much slower rate, can flow vertically as well as
21
horizontally, and flow direction and rate can be influenced by
pumping. One of the most important political consequences of flow in
surface water – the creation of upper and lower riparians – is more
complex when it comes to groundwater. In the international domain,
these factors are relevant because groundwater flow can, under some
conditions, create an upstream/downstream relationship between
sharing states.22 Often, however, the direction of flow is not uniform,
does not always flow toward a common terminus, can connect
otherwise unrelated river basins, and is difficult to detect. Moreover,
the impacts of its use as a source or a sink can cause effects
throughout the resource pool, with pollution traveling in all directions
from the point of contamination and the water table dropping
throughout the aquifer as a result of overdrafting.23 Under these flow
conditions hydrological “blowback” is a real possibility with
groundwater.
Finally, groundwater and surface water are both renewable, yet
the rates at which they are renewed through natural recharge can
vary dramatically. Surface water renews through the direct effects of
precipitation on a daily, weekly, or monthly time scale. By contrast,
groundwater renews on a monthly to millennial time scale through
WORLD AND THEIR USE 24 (Igor S. Zekster & Lome G. Everett eds., 2004), available at http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001344/134433e.pdf.
19. Mechlem, supra note 8, at 58 (2003); see also Burke et al., supra note 16, at 40 (noting
the technical impossibility or economic infeasibility of cleaning up an aquifer once polluted).
20. With the exception of groundwater in fully confined, “fossil” aquifers, groundwater
does flow through aquifers.
21. Stephen Foster, Essential Concepts for Groundwater Regulators, in GROUNDWATER:
LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 15, 16 (noting predominantly horizontal
flow).
22. See, e.g., Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 7, at 213-14 (describing the hydrogeology of
the mixed confined-unconfined Mountain, or West Bank, Aquifer that recharges only in the
unconfined portion located in the Judean Mountains of the West Bank and flows toward the
confined portion in Israel); M. El-Fadel, R. Quba’a, N. El-Hougeiri, Z. Hashisho & D. Jamali,
The Israeli Palestinian Mountain Aquifer: A Case Study in Ground Water Conflict Resolution, 30
J. NAT. RESOURCES & LIFE SCI. EDUC. 50 (2001) (providing a detailed case study of this
transboundary aquifer).
23. See Mechlem, supra note 8 (discussing some of the physical characteristics of
groundwater).
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the less direct effects of surface water and precipitation percolating
through the unsaturated zone. Slower rates of groundwater recharge
are both a strength and weakness of groundwater: groundwater is
more vulnerable to overdrafting, but it can also be a more reliable
source of water since it is relatively immune to seasonal fluctuations
in precipitation.
The spatial externalities associated with the use of groundwater
are bounded, more or less, by the aquifer system in which the
particular groundwater resource pool is located. Although pollution
can flow out of an aquifer into hydraulically connected surface water,
and overdrafting can have negative effects on the flow of connected
surface water and the stability of the overlying land, the scope of
these effects is regional, not global. Because the hydrologic cycle will
be impacted by climate change, climate change and related water
24
issues are sometimes considered together. Although connected, the
human/environment problems of water on the one hand, and climate
change on the other, are quite different, especially in scope. With
respect to the climate puzzle in which greenhouse gas emissions, the
atmosphere, and forests are all directly involved, groundwater is an
innocent bystander.25 Groundwater is neither part of the climate
change problem – groundwater is not a source of greenhouse gas
emissions – nor part of its solution – it does not act as a carbon sink as
forests do.26 Although climate models predict an increase in overall

24. See, e.g., Symposium, Local Property, Global Justice: Law and Resources in the Era of
Climate Change, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. (forthcoming 2009) (consisting of three panels on
greenhouse gas emissions, forests, and water).
25. In this sense groundwater stands in the same place relative to the climate puzzle as sea
level rise. Scarce groundwater and rising sea levels do not contribute to the problem or to the
solution of climate change, but are directly affected by the changing climate. Of course the truly
innocent bystanders are those who rely on groundwater to survive in areas where it will become
increasingly scarce as a result of changes in climate, or those living in low lying coastal areas that
might soon be inundated.
26. Groundwater is not without links to climate change, however it is not directly involved
in the processes.
Groundwater does not emit greenhouse gases. However, its extraction often requires
pumping which can involve the use of greenhouse gas emitting processes. Biswas notes that
“[t]he linkages between groundwater and energy requirements are high. . . . Estimates . . .
indicate that 12%-13% of all electricity generated in Mexico is used to pump water up and
down.” Asit Biswas, Water Crisis: Current Perceptions and Future Realities, in GROUNDWATER:
LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 1, 9.
Groundwater is not a carbon sink. However, it is used to irrigate vegetation that in turn acts
as a carbon sink. The vegetation in wetlands, which require the presence of surface water (and
in some cases groundwater) make substantial contributions to the carbon sequestration process.
Groundwater does have a sink functionality in the sense that it absorbs pollution, but most of
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precipitation globally, the spatial and temporal distribution of this
increased precipitation will not lead to increased groundwater
27
recharge in those regions most in need of it. In some regions
groundwater could become scarcer as a result of climate change,
28
especially in already arid, low- or mid-latitude regions. In arid
regions major aquifer recharge episodes are already rare, occurring
“as infrequently as once a decade, or even once a century.”29 Reduced
precipitation could have a multiplicative effect on groundwater
recharge. Indeed, one recent MIT study found that “a 20 percent
decrease in rainfall could lead to a 70 percent decrease in the
30
recharging of local aquifers.”
II. A TAXONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES
Scholars of collective action and common-pool resource
arrangements differentiate types of goods and services on the basis of
31
their rivalness and their excludability. Unfortunately, most of the
this pollution attenuation functionality can be attributed to the soil and sediment of the
unsaturated, or vadose zone through which groundwater percolates.
Finally, it seems conceivable that certain deep and fully confined aquifers could be used for
future geologic carbon sequestration, although that use is not currently being pursued in the
United States. “Geologic carbon sequestration involves the separation and capture of CO2 at
the point of emissions from stationary sources followed by storage in deep underground
geologic formations.” 2008 Carbon Sequestration Atlas of the United States and Canada, supra
note 3, at 6.
27. See GROUNDWATER RESOURCES OF THE WORLD AND THEIR USE, supra note 18, at
285 (discussing the limitations of general circulation models to predict changes at a regional
scale).
28. See Isamu Kayane, Global Warming and Groundwater Resources in Arid Lands, in
FRESHWATER RESOURCES IN ARID LANDS, UNU GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM V 70
(Juha I. Uitto & Jutta Schneider eds., 1997) (discussing indirect influence of global warming on
local precipitation).
29. Stephen Foster, supra note 21, at 15, 23.
30. David Chandler, Water Supplies could be strongly affected by climate change, MIT
NEWS, Dec. 18, 2008, http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2008/agu-groundwater-1218.html.
The same MIT study indicates a disproportionately large recharge effect with only small
increases in precipitation, which is not good news for areas plagued with an overabundance of
groundwater. This article assumes scarcity or underprovision of the goods and services
associated with the groundwater resource, although it is possible that some regions will
experience an overabundance of groundwater as a result of changing patterns of precipitation.
An overabundance of groundwater would create flooding. Combined with predicted sea level
rise and intensified storm events, this could create serious problems in low-lying coastal areas.
31. Dichotomizing these two variables into rival/non-rival (or subtractibility) and
excludable/non-excludable we can differentiate between private goods (rival/excludable), pure
public goods (non-rival/non-excludable), club goods (non-rival/excludable), and common pool
resources (rival/non-excludable). The last of these types poses the problems associated with the
tragedy of the commons. See Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Common Pools: Solving
Problems Arising in Human/Environment Relations, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J., 1, 3 fig.1 (2007).
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goods and services provided by the limited natural resources of our
planet – including water, land, fish, and the sink functionalities of our
air, atmosphere, stratospheric ozone, forests and water – are rival,
such that the use of a good or service by one reduces the availability
of that good or service to others. Although these resources do not
vary in terms of their rivalness, they do vary markedly in the level of
excludability. For the purpose of understanding the appropriate scope
of a regime or the spatial extent of the externalities associated with a
resource, excludability is the more useful variable. The ability or right
to exclude is also an element in the traditional bundle of local
property rights and excludability goes directly to the question of
relevant actors. In the context of finding the right fit, the relevant
actors are those who have access to the goods and services provided
by the resource or who experience the externalities of its use.32
A three-class taxonomy of resources in the international domain
dependent entirely on the excludability variable could be a useful tool
for understanding the appropriate scope of the related regime.
Positioning within this taxonomy will shed light on the spatial extent
of the externalities of the resource and therefore, who should be
considered in the management of the resource. It should be noted
that the physical location of the resource is not important to this
taxonomy, but rather what are the number and identities of the actors
who are impacted by or enjoy the externalities associated with the
resource. The three classes are (1) sovereign resources (fully
excludable); (2) shared resources (partially excludable); (3) commons
resources (non-excludable).
A. Sovereign Resources
Sovereign resources are located wholly within the territory of a
single state, the goods and services of the resource are fully
excludable to those beyond the territory of that state, and the
externalities associated with the use of the resource do not spill over

Non-rivalness is also referred to as jointness. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14 n.21 (rev. ed. 1971).
However, Ostrom cautions against confusing rivalness of resource units with jointness of a
resource system. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 32 (1990).
32. “Excludability” is often used to mean keeping potential users from goods or services,
which I have equated with positive externalities in this essay. Here, “excludability,” is also used
to draw the line between those who are and those who are not impacted by “bads” or negative
externalities.
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the territorial boundaries of the resource state.33 In general, the
resources controlled by a sovereign state include those on the surface,
in the airspace (ad coelum) and those in the subsoil (ad inferos) of the
territory.34 For coastal states, sovereign territory also generates
sovereign rights over the natural resources of the water column,
35
seabed and subsoil of the exclusive economic zone. A coal deposit or
biological resource located entirely within the territory of a single
36
state would fall into this category of sovereign resources. Such
sovereign resources, being fully excludable, are private goods. Their
‘ownership’ structure most closely resembles private property: a
single rights-holder with a complete bundle of sticks that is subject
only to the omni-present rule of property ownership sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (use your own so as not to injure another).
Because this limiting rule is only activated in the event of spillover, its
activation necessarily changes the resource from a sovereign resource
into one of the other two types; shared resource or commons
resource.
B. Shared Resources
Shared resources are those subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
two or more states. These are excludable for non-members but nonexcludable within the group of sharing states since there is spillover
among a limited subset of all states. In other words, the spatial extent
of the externalities may be regional, but is not global. Shared
resources, being only partially excludable, are limited-access common
pool resources – a form of collective good. Their ‘ownership’
structure most closely resembles common property with some duties

33. These are also referred to as “internal resources.” See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Collective
Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources
Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 384, 384 (1996). Specifically with respect to groundwater found within
the exclusive jurisdiction of a single state, one author has coined the term “State-owned
aquifers.” Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Transboundary
Groundwater, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 167 (1991). This term, which was developed to
describe the resource in the international domain, could confuse if misapplied in the local
domain where it would imply state or public as opposed to private ownership of the resource.
34. See Rainer Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits across National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT’L L.
215, 216 (1979) (ad inferos with respect to mineral resources).
35. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 56(1)(a), Nov. 16, 1994, 18
U.N.T.S. 3.
36. The latter despite the perambulatory affirmation that “biological diversity is a common
concern of humankind.” Convention on Biological Diversity pmbl., entered into force Dec. 29,
1993, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (emphasis added).
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owed from one rights holder to another.37 In the international domain
many of these duties may not rise to the status of binding obligations,
but they would at least define standards of good behavior and might
include good neighborliness, a general obligation to cooperate, the
principles of information and consultation, environmental impact
assessment procedures, and the principle of non-discrimination.38
Some resources in this category include hydrocarbon deposits that
straddle an international boundary and shared fish resources found
within the exclusive economic zones of two or more countries.
Transboundary airsheds and watersheds would also qualify as shared
resources. The question of how, exactly, these transboundary
resources are to be shared – both in terms of allocating the benefits
and mitigating or compensating for the negative externalities
associated with the resource – is one for the sharing states to
determine by agreement within the strictures of any overarching
international law rules and obligations. At a minimum, sharing states
are bound by the customary rule against allowing activities within
their territory to cause significant harm in the territory of another
state.39 It is also argued that “equitable utilization” is the customary
international law sharing rule for shared resources creating binding, if
40
vague, obligations for sharing states.

37. At the outset of the ILC’s work on “shared natural resources,” member states were
careful to distinguish between shared ownership, an idea some were resistant to, and shared
responsibility for resource management, which was the understanding of “shared” adopted by
the Special Rapporteur. See Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], Report of the Commission at the FiftyEight Session, ch. 9, ¶403, supplement no. 10 (A/58/10) (2006).
38. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12
MICH. J. INT’L L. 420, 434 (1991) (describing the role of “soft” international environmental law
norms in describing standards of behavior for states).
39. This rule is considered by most to be a binding rule of customary international law, one
of the only of its kind in the field of international environmental law. There seems to be some
agreement that this limiting rule, expressed in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, has achieved
the status of customary international law. See, e.g., PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 (7th ed. 1997) (“Principle 2 [of the Rio
Declaration] confirms the prohibition of transboundary environmental harm . . . which is now
recognized as customary law reflecting the principle of limited territorial sovereignty and
integrity . . . .”).
40. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, General Principles Governing the Cooperation between States in
Relation to Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 14 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 3, 10
(2003); see also Julio Barberis, The Development of International Law of Transboundary
Groundwater, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 167, 175 (1991) (“The rule [of equitable utilization] enjoys
wide acceptance today and is part of general international law.”); Eyal Benvenisti, Collective
Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources
Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L, 384, 414 (1996) (“[T]he vague standard [of equitable use] increases the
likelihood of cooperation by encouraging riparians to negotiate rather than litigate. . . .”).
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C. Commons Resources
Commons resources typically exist in an area of the “global
commons” – those areas beyond the limit of national jurisdiction of
any state – such as the living marine resources outside the exclusive
economic zone, the stratospheric ozone layer, and, at least for now,
Antarctica. But the location of the resource is not the determining
factor in this taxonomy; rather, it is whether the benefits of the goods
and services supplied by the resource can be accessed by all users or
whether the negative externalities associated with the resource have
global reach. Commons resources, being non-excludable, are openaccess, common-pool resources. Because they are typically rival in
nature, commons resources are not pure public goods, although they
are sometimes referred to as public goods.41 Within commons
resources there are two distinct subtypes: res nullius the ownership
structure of which resembles null property subject to the rule of
capture, and common heritage of humankind resources, which
resemble public property in that these resources may not be
appropriated through capture and are normally subject to
international management.
In the interest of effective regime design, and with proper fit in
mind, it is clear that the position of a resource in this taxonomy
should drive the scope of the regime intended to address problems
associated with that resource. A wholly internal, sovereign resource,
for instance, will need no international resource regime, as all of the
problems associated with the resource will be internal to the state in
which the resource is located. On the other hand, a commons
resource will require a regime that includes all states, that is, a regime
of global scope. Forests as sources and sinks of greenhouse gases with
global spillover effects and total non-excludability are positioned
squarely within the commons resource classification and, thus, are a
prime example of resources that require a regime of global scope.
Regimes designed to address shared resources fall in the middle of
these extremes, requiring the participation of sharing states only.
Groundwater, whose externalities are spatially bounded and which is
excludable to non-groundwater states, is a shared resource requiring a
41. See OSTROM, supra note 31, at 32-33 (distinguishing between common pool resources
on the one hand and collective or public goods on the other); see also OLSON, supra note 31, at
14-15 (using “common,” “collective,” and “public goods” interchangeably to describe a nonrival good within a limited group of users); Benvenisti, supra note 40 at 384 (referring to public
goods as those “to which all states enjoy potentially unrestricted access” and distinguishing from
a “collective good to which only the riparian states enjoy access”).
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regime with a more limited scope: involving only the particular
groundwater states. To apply a regime of global scope to problems
associated with shared resources would create an unhelpful and
unnecessary mismatch.
The emerging international law regimes for forests, in the
context of climate change, and for shared groundwater tend to
confirm these classifications. The Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is part of a
regime of global scope designed to achieve the “stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system.”42 Forests as sources and sinks of greenhouse gases are
explicitly included within the accounting scheme created under the
Kyoto Protocol and subsequent agreements within the climate change
regime.43 In contrast, the emerging transboundary groundwater
regime contemplates only bilateral or regional agreements or
arrangements for the management of particular shared resource
pools.44
III. THE MISCONCEPTION OF GROUNDWATER AS A
COMMONS RESOURCE
There are some indications in the academic literature and in the
record of multilateral law-making negotiations that groundwater is
being misconceived as a commons resource. There are several
possible sources of this misconception; some originate in the
international domain, others in the local domain. If fit is an important

42. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107.
43. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art.
3 ¶ 3, Dec. 11, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add. 1 (“The net changes in greenhouse gas
emissions by sources and removal by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change
and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990 . . .
shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I.”).
At the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties (part two) in Bonn the Parties
expanded on the principles governing forestry activities within the climate change regime.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, June 16-27, 2001, Review of the
Implementation of Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Convention, Annex VII, U.N.
Doc FCCC/CP/2001/L.7 (July 24, 2001).
44. Int’l Law Comm’n [ILC], Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, art. 9,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.724 (May 29, 2008) (“For the purpose of managing a particular
transboundary aquifer or aquifer system, aquifer States are encouraged to enter into bilateral or
regional agreements or arrangements among themselves.”).
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determinant of regime effectiveness, the misconception must be
dispelled.
It is undeniable that international environmental problems pose
a challenge to “the traditional notion of national sovereignty that
45
states may do whatever they please within their own territory.” This
tension between absolute territorial sovereignty and international
environmental problems can be restated: notions of absolute
territorial sovereignty pose a major obstacle to the solution of some
international environmental problems. In fact, this tension has put
absolute territorial sovereignty under pressure for more than a
century, and has resulted in a widely-recognized rule of customary
international law that limits or constrains absolute territorial
sovereignty, one of the more recent verbalizations of which is found
in Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental
and have the responsibility to ensure that activities within
their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
46
national jurisdiction.

Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration is little more than a
restatement of a long-standing rule of customary international law.47
Nonetheless, relatively new realizations about the far-reaching affect
of human activities on the environment have brought new attention
to the transboundary, and in some cases global, scope of activities
carried out within the territory of a sovereign state, the broader
relevance of the obligations embodied in Principle 2, and the duty
owed to a growing number of actors beyond the territory of
individual sovereign states.
But the modern international law view of constrained or limited
sovereignty does not equate to an absence of sovereignty. Indeed,

45. David

Freestone,

,
GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES,
note 12, at 191-92 (citing Gunther Handl,
, 1 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 3, 32 (1990)).
46. U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev., June 3-14, 1992,
, Rio de Janeiro, princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1/Vol.1 (1992)
(emphasis added). This language is identical to Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration
except “and developmental” was added to Rio. See
(“Stockholm Declaration”), Stockholm, June 5-16,
1972, princ. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (1973).
47
., Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int’l Abr. Awards 1905 (1941).
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real obligations to neighboring states with respect to shared resources
do not equate to obligations owed erga omnes to all states irrespective
of their relationship to the resource in question. Nonetheless, wellrespected scholars make statements that appear to be based on just
these false equations. With respect to groundwater in particular one
author writes:
Exploitation of scarce, transboundary groundwater resources can
no longer be seen as an issue exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the State under the territory of which these resources extend. For
the vast continental groundwater resources . . . there can be argued
to be obligations owed erga omnes
resources of
international concern

all states have a legal interest

tor noted that “[t]hroughout much of the debate leading to
the Draft Articles, numerous Members of the [ILC] and of the Sixth
Committee opined that permanent sovereignty over natural resources
was central to the subject matter and must be recognized in the Draft
48.

Freestone,

note 45, at 202 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted). In his
ERGA OMNES
erga omnes
erga omnes

ERGA OMNES
supra
quoting
International Law and the
Protection of the Global Atmosphere: Concepts, Categories and Principles in

Groundwater

Second Report on Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary
prepared by

Commentary on the U.N. International Law Commission’s Draft
Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers
. Id.

See, e.g

supra
. See
. See
The Problem of Water
per, http://www.u.artizona.edu/~libecap/downloads/TheProblemOfWater.pdf) (comparing the
resource characteristics of land, fresh water and wild-ocean fish stocks, and concluding that the
challenges of defining property rights in water is more like the challenges associated with fish
than with land.); Stephen Foster, Essential Concepts for Groundwater Regulators, in
GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 21 (“Groundwaters
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in the international domain is non-excludable in the local domain.
Scaling-up to the international domain, the number of ‘owners’ is
reduced by many orders of magnitude, and the natural boundaries of
the resource no longer far outstrip the artificial territorial boundaries
of its users.
Second, in the local domain, the problem with water is typically
described as one in which private property interests thwart the
56
management of a common pool resource. This relationship is flipped
when viewed at the international scale, where the concern is
misconceiving groundwater as a commons resource when in fact it is a
sovereign resource similar to private property, or at most a shared
resource similar to common property jointly owned by a small group.
Third, in some national systems the state owns the groundwater
resources of the nation, such that groundwater is in the public domain
and not owned privately, appurtenant to land ownership or
otherwise.57 Yet, the international domain does not have an analog to
the public domain in areas otherwise subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction and control of a sovereign state. The common heritage of
humankind concept is the closest equivalent, but has only been
applied to resources and areas beyond national jurisdiction.
The first two examples are entirely a function of scale and the
changes that occur in the relationship between the spatial extent of
the resource and the spatial extent of the actors involved in its use.
The third example demonstrates that local institutions do not
necessarily have international counterparts. All three examples
demonstrate that borrowing across the two domains – applying local
property and common pool resource concepts and lessons to similar
problems in the international domain – can be useful but should be
done cautiously.
CONCLUSION
A regime intended to manage the use of a particular
groundwater resource pool as either a source of water or a sink for
(like fish) are a resource for which property rights are not obviously defined in the legal
sense.”).
56. Jacob Burke, Marcus Moench & Claude Sauveplane, Groundwater and Society:
Problems in Variability and Points of Engagement, in GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 12, at 49 (“[C]ontrol over abstraction and protection of the resource
base continues to be thwarted by the perception and treatment of groundwater as a private
resource – despite the evident common pool properties of groundwater.”).
57. Solanes, supra note 12, at 70 (“Most systems of water law explicitly include water
within the public domain of the state, the people or the nation.”).
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pollution need not be global in scope; rather, the spatial extent of the
regime should match the spatial extent of the externalities associated
with the resource. Beyond that scope users can be excluded from the
benefits of the resource, are not subject to its negative externalities,
and should be excluded from the regime designed to manage the
resource. The ILC draft articles on the law of transboundary aquifers
and the limited amount of state practice that exists both indicate that
the international groundwater resource regime is heading in this
direction.
This is the international groundwater resource regime as it is
currently developing: the lex lata

Rights, Rules, and Common Pools: Solving Problems Arising in
Human/Environment Relations

